ByStephen Noerper, EastWest Institute
North
Korea’s decision to kick out United Nations’ weapons
inspectors dramatically ups the ante in its challenge to President
Barack Obama and the international community. In response to the
U.N. Security Council condemnation of North Korea’s missile
launch on April 5, Pyongyang is moving fast to implement a clear-cut
agenda. Among its key points:
Test the resolve of a young Democratic president with his first real crisis and push the United States to accept bilateral negotiations as a means of seeking a solution to this issue. North Korea sees the popular U.S. leader—fresh off the G-20 and NATO summits—as someone who may be willing to be far more accommodating than his predecessor, especially now that his administration has already signaled new openings to Iran and Cuba. It desperately wants diplomatic normalization with the United States and the trade and aid that would accompany such a breakthrough. It wants Washington to pick up where the last Democratic President, Bill Clinton, left off: having sent then-Secretary Albright to Pyongyang, there were whispers of a possible U.S. presidential visit. Pyongyang then had leveraged the capture of a U.S. helicopter pilot to secure Washington’s attention, and it now holds two young American journalists who crossed into North Korean territory as bargaining
chips.
Test the resolve of the international community, especially of the other six-party talk members. North Korea’s first response to the U.N. announcement was to announce its withdrawal from the multilateral dialogue. In doing so, Pyongyang hopes to drive a wedge between its more powerful dialogue partners. Moscow and Beijing—which pushed the U.N. Security Council away from sanctions or a stronger resolution—now bear the burden of bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table. This will take some doing, with likely guarantees of heightened assistance from the two. Pyongyang also hopes to exploit the low popularity ratings of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso, further weakening their standing by demonstrating its disdain for their denunciations of the rocket launch.
Quell any whispers among its population or outside observers about the possible shakiness of Kim Jong Il’s regime. Shortly before the latest display of defiance, Kim Jong Il was shown on television receiving parliamentary approval for his renewed tenure as head of the National Defense Commission, the “highest guiding organ” of the military, according to North Korea’s 1998 constitution. This was meant to prove that he is still very much in command, despite persistent rumors about his deteriorating health. But Kim looked visibly weakened by his August stroke, and there are growingexpectations of the announcement of his successor soon. The most likely prospect: his third son Kim Jong Un, extending the family dynasty to the next generation, under the regency of Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law.
Look impressive to international arms buyers. Despite the general failure of the early April launch—the final two stages of the missile falling into the Pacific—North Korea still managed to surprise many outsiders by sending its rocket 2,000 miles. It may want to test again soon to make further refinements. Given its general poverty and scarcity of natural resources, with the exception of bauxite and a few other low-priced commodities, North Korea may be upping reliance on weapons exports to bring in much-needed cash. A growing challenge, however, lies in South Korea’s decision to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led 90-nation effort to interdict banned weaponry. This could trigger new confrontations.
<>In the coming days and months, it’s more than likely that North Korea will continue to push Washington and the international community to the brink of crisis—just as it did in 1993, when it withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). When it comes to international crises, the challenge posed by Somali pirates is likely to appear relatively simple compared to what the North Koreans are up to. The most difficult challenge facing the Obama administration will be to coordinate its response with Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo and Seoul, its partners in this enterprise who tend to pull in opposite directions.
Noerper is a Senior Fellow, Asia, at the EastWest Institute.